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ABSTRACT 
Recent empirical evidence from field surveys and controlled laboratory 
experiments reveal anomalies with respect  to  decisions by individuals to protect  
themselves against low probability, high loss events. In particular, behavior is 
frequently a t  odds with what would be predicted by standard models of choice 
which involve benefit-cost comparisons. 
This paper develops a framework for analyzing decisions for low probability 
events and discusses their policy implications. The framework highlights the  fol- 
lowing four interrelated components: 
(1) Type of information collected by individuals in making their decisions 
(i.e., accuracy of data on losses, probabilities and protective options); 
(2) The decision process of individuals (e.g., expected utility maximization, 
threshold models); 
(3) Implications of policies on specific groups (e.g., affected individuals. 
general taxpayers); and 
(4) Welfare implications (e.g., equity and efficiency considerations). 
Examples from studies on natural hazards, health and szfety problems will 
be used to illustrate how this framework synthesizes descriptive models of 
choice with policy prescription. The paper concludes by suggesting directions 
for future research. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
11. DEVELOPING A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Ill. ILLUSTRATNE EXAMPLES 
Safer Power Mowers 
Motor Vehicle Safety 
Cigarette Smoking 
Siting of LNG Facilities 
IV. INSURAYCE AGAINST NATURAL HAZARDS 
Problem Formulation 
Interested Parties 
Decision Processes 
Formulating Alternative Policies 
Evaluating Strategies 
V. TOWARDS A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF CfiOlCE 
Performance of a Market System 
Role of Government 
NOTES 
REFERENCES 
DECISION MAKING FOR LOW PROBABILITY 
EVENTS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Howard Kunreuther 
I. INTRODUCTION* 
\ 
Society has become increasingly concerned with developing appropriate 
measures for mitigating the consequences of low probability events which have 
potentially large losses. It should be recognized a t  the outset that  what is a low 
probabihty event for one interested party may be viewed as  a high probability 
event for another. Similarly, the relative magnitude of the losses is also a func- 
tion of where one sits. For example, the chances of suffering a severe property 
loss from a natural disaster or a severe injury from an automobile accident may 
be viewed as very small by a single individual but treated as relatively high by a 
government agency concerned with national losses. Property damage from a 
fire may appear staggering to the  affected family but seem relatively small at  a 
more aggregate level because of the different bases used to evaluate conse- 
quences. 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework for dealing with events which 
are perceived to have a small chance of occurrent? by a t  least one of the 
interested parties. The approach emphasizes the importance of undertaking 
descriptive analysis as a critical input for prescriptive recommendations. 
After outlining the framework (Section II), I will illustrate its applicability in 
Section 111 with several examples which have both personal significance (e.g., 
safety of power mowers and motor vehicles) as well as societal importance (e.g., 
siting of LNG facilities). The importance of understanding decision processes as 
.I would like to thank Uday Apte for helping to gather material on the illustrative examples 
discussed in section II of the paper. 
a critical input to policy is underscored by empirical data on individual decision 
making with respect to insurance protection against natural hazards. Section N 
summarizes key results from a large-scale field survey and controlled laboratory 
experiments which comprised this four-year study and illustrates the possible 
roles that  the public and private sectors can play in providing better protection 
against future losses. In the concluding section, a more formal model is pro- 
posed which incorporates the decision processes and the role of information as 
critical inputs for developing prescriptive measures. 
Fuure  1 depicts a conceptual framework for structuring the analysis. An 
appropriate starting point is Problem Formulation (Box 1). Before undertaking a 
detailed analysis one needs to identify and define the problem. What are the 
goals and objectives corresponding to the particular area  of concern? Can one 
gain insight into the nature of the problem through an historical perspective? 
This initial definitional phase is critically important as it enables one to  under- 
take a detailed descriptive or behavioral analysis which can then be linked to 
alternative strategies. Furthermore, it  helps limit the types f policies or plans 
that are relevant and provides guidelines for evaluating them. P 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for analysis s t ruc tu r~ .  
Let us turn now to the descriptive phase. We need to define and describe 
explicitly the interested parties (Box 2 )  impacted by the problem. Three sectors 
are considered in the illustrative examples which follow: consumers (i.e., those 
who demand the particular products or are directly or indirectly &ected by it); 
firms or enterprises (i.e.. the organizations or business or supply the product); 
and government (i.e.. public sector agencies or bureaus who interact with the 
private sector-consumers and enterprises). For each problem there a re  a set of 
legal and political constraints which determine how information currently flows 
between the three sectors and the groups within each sector. It is important to 
understand the  dynamics of this interaction: who interacts with whom, and when  
this interaction takes place. 
The other key element of the descriptive phase is the decision processes 
(Box 3)  of each of the involved interested parties. By decision processes we 
mean the collection and processing of information relevant to the problem being 
analyzed. Recent empirical evidence from field and experimental studies have 
revealed systematic biases with respect to the processing of information and 
simplified rules in combining data in making decisions (Fischhoff, e t  al. 1980; 
Kunreuther. e t  al. 1978; and Tversky and Kahneman 1974). These findings shed 
considerable light on the relative importance of external events. such as past 
experience, as well a s  internal dynamics, such as discussions with others. in 
influencing decisions on low probability events. It is thus clear that the collec- 
tion and processing of information are likely to be closely tied to  the relevant 
constraints and the interactions between the interested parties. 
Turning now to the prescriptive phase, there is a need to  formulate a l t m a -  
tive plans or courses of actions (Box 4) for coping with a particular problem. The 
generation of goals and objectives for any problem w i l l  suggest a set  of plans to  
be considered. Two types of institutional arrangements between the interested 
parties circumscribe the types of plans which can be considered. One extreme 
is for consumers and firms to interact through a market system without any 
government involvement. The other extreme is for government to impose strict 
regulations which gives the private sector no freedom of choice. Most strategies 
are between these two extremes: the government sector utilizes incentives such 
as subsidies and taxes along with some regulations and information exchange to 
guide consumer and firm market interactions. 
Finally, there is a need to evaluate plans (Box 5). How well different poli- 
cies perform will be influenced by the decision processes of the interested par- 
ties. The ranking of M e r e n t  policies is also contingent upon the relative impor- 
tance given to the interested parties. If residents in hazard-prone areas are 
deemed important enough to merit special treatment after a disaster, then 
Strategy A may be much more appealing than Strategy B. On the other hand, if 
disaster victims are deemed responsible for their o m  recovery, then Strategy B 
may be seen as preferable to Strategy A. In evaluating different measures one 
has to include the compliance costs which must be p by the sellers as well as 9 the enforcement costs which utilize government funds. 
111. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
The framework depicted in Figure 1 can be applied to a set of problems 
which involve protective measures to reduce the probability of an event or miti- 
gate its consequences. The section begins with those which involve personal 
safety and conclude with broader societal issues. The purpose of these illustra- 
tions is to show how the framework can structure analysis; no detailed evalua- 
tion of alternatives is undertaken. 
Safer Power Mowers 
Should power mowers be made safer? Each year approximately 75,000 peo- 
ple come in contact with moving power mower blades which can cause severe 
injuries. Nearly 10,000 of the blade-contact injuries involve amputations of 
fingers or toes (Washington Post 1979a). The problem involves a tradeoff 
between the costs of producing a safer mower and the reduction in injuries 
which presumably would result. In this case, the relevant interested parties are 
the homeowner or gardener who has or desires a power mower; the lawn mower 
industry; and the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), the regulatory 
agency with the responsibility for approving safety standards in this area. 
The decision processes of consumers plays a critical role in evaluating any 
policy. If individuals are  careless because they feel tha t  nothir,g can happen to 
them when they utilize a mower, then it may be necessary to make power 
mowers safer. In addition, or as an alternative, warnings could be provided on 
the dangers of the mower (e.g., not to use it on wet grass). How well this infor- 
mation is actually processed by individuals determines how well such a policy 
works. 
With respect to  al ternat ive  plans, y e  CPCS has proposed mandatory safety 
standards in designing power mowers. Industry claims that  this regulation. 
which would increase the cost of a power mower by $35, is too strong. In 
evaluating these plans questions of product liability arise: Is the manufacturer 
responsible should there be an injury from a mower? A recent case awarded 
$6000 to  a man who lost par t  of his foot in a lawn mower. The company claimed 
that  the accident. which occurred because the person's foot slipped on wet 
grass. could have been avoided had he read the user manual which warned : "Do 
not use this mower on Wet Grass." In this case ignorance was considered an 
excuse and the claim was upheld (Business Week, February 12, 1979). 
Motor Vehicle Safe ty  
What are the appropriate safety measures for reducing deaths and injuries 
from motor vehicles? This question has some significance when one studies the 
statistics for the United States: "In 1977, motor vehicles caused 47,700 deaths, 
1,900,000 disabling injuries, and approximately $12 billion in property damage" 
(Bick and Hohenemser 1979). A t  present less than 20% of the drivers or 
passengers in private vehicles protect themselves by wearing seat belts even 
though they are installed in all cars. Here, the problem involves the tradeofis 
between personal freedom and possible adverse consequences to individuals and 
society when people do not voluntarily protect themselves. The relevant 
interested part ies  are  the drivers and passengers, the  automobile industry. and 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the regulatory agency 
empowered to deal with motor vehicle safety. 
Echoing the  same theme as above, the decision processes of consumers are 
critically important for designing prescriptive measures. Empirical evidence 
from laboratory studies suggests that one reason people do not voluntarily take 
protective action such as wearing safety belts, is because they feel that  the pro- 
bability of an accident is so small that  they don't have to worry about it (Slovic, 
e t  al. 1978). A survey conducted by National Analysts (1971) for the  Department 
of Transportation revealed that  those most likely to  wear belts are  ones who 
have been asked by others to  wear them. This raises the question of the irnpor- 
tance of personal influence in the decision making process. 
At  a policy level there  are  several options which can be considered. Market 
mechanisms such as lower insurance premiums for cars equipped with passive 
restraints (e.g., automatic belts or air bags) could encourage people to volun- 
tarily adopt these measures. Some countries do not pay insurance claims for 
injuries if it is shown tha t  the individual has not protected himself with a safety 
belt, thereby providing economic incentives for individuals to use them. A 
stronger measure, utilized in some countries is t o  impose a fine for those not 
wearing the belt. An ext reme measure would be to  require t h a t  all autos be 
equipped with a passive restraint .  Each of these measures  has to  be evaluated 
on  a number of dimensions, the most  important being the  costs  of imposing the 
particular approach and the potential benefits. As in all the  examples in this 
section some parties will be  helped while others  will suffer depending on which 
alternative is chosen. 
Cigarette  Smoking 
Should one impose restr ict ions on cigarettes to d e t e r  individuals from 
smoking and if so  how should this be done? This question is stimulated by 
empirical da ta  which suggests t ha t  annually 350,000 lives a re  lost and approxi- 
mately $18 billion in hospital bills a r e  incurred from diseases caused by smoking 
(Washington Post  1979b). The relevant a n t e ~ e s t e d  p a r t i e s  a r e  smokers,  non- 
smokers,  the tobacco industry and  the Office of Smoking and Health, a regula- 
tory agency concerned with the  effects of cigaret te  smoking. 
The decis ion processes  of smokers  are  critical to t h e  design of alternative 
policies. If individuals a r e  aware t h a t  smoking is harmful to  them bu t  ignore 
these potential effects, e i ther  because they feel "nothing will happen to me,"  
then  additional information campaigns are  unlikely to change behavior. There is 
also the question as  t o  how sensitive the  smoker is t o  price changes in cigarettes 
should additional taxes be imposed. 
The spec t rum of a l t m a t i v e  p l a n s  range from m a r k e t  solutions (do nothing 
and let people suffer the  consequences) t o  s t r ic t  regulation (banning 
cigarettes). Recent proposals have involved a s e t  of incentive systems,  such  a s  
increasing taxes  and using the  revenue t o  help smokers  quit (Harris 1980), or  
prohibiting smoking in cer ta in  public places (e.g.. hospitals, theaters ,  and retail 
stores) (Washington Post  1979b). In evaluating these plans one recognizes tha t  
different importance weights on the relevant interested parties may lead t o  
different rankings. For example, a policy of "do nothing" favors the smokers  and 
the tobacco industry while banning cigarette: has the  reverse effect. Taxation 
policies and fines for smoking in certain places falls somewhere between the  
above two extremes.  
Si t ing  3f LhrG Fac i l i f i e s  
Liquefied natural  gas (LNG) is a potential source of energy which requires a 
fairly complicated technological process tha t  has the potential, albeit with very 
low probability, of creating severe losses. To import LNG the gas has to be con- 
verted to  liquid form a t  about 1/600 the  volume. It  is shipped in specially con- 
s t ructed tankers  and received a t  a terminal where it undergoes regasification 
and is then distributed. The ent ire  system (i.e., t h e  liquefication facility, the  
LNG tanker and the receiving terminal and regasification facility) can  cost more  
than  $1 billion t o  construct  (Office of Technology Assessment 1977). The siting 
problem of interest  is whether  one should locate facilities for regasifying and 
shipping LNG and if so where would be the bes t  place. The i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s  a re  
the  residents of a reas  considered as potential sites,  those benefiting from this 
additional source of energy, t he  gas companies or consortium who a re  willing t o  
invest in a proposed project and government agencies a t  the Federal. s ta te ,  and 
local level who have responsibility for trading off the costs (including potential 
losses from an accident) and benefits of any decision. 
Turning now to the decision proces s  associated with siting, there are ques- 
tions as to how each of the groups utilize information on the probability of any 
accident to an  LNG terminal and the resulting consequences. One of the contro- 
versies emerging in the siting debate is whether one can or should specify an 
acceptable level of risk. Some risk assessments of a particular site focus on the 
chances of a catastrophic accident and conclude that  it is acceptable if the pro- 
bability is below some critical level. Others have utilized worst case scenarios 
and paid attention to the consequences without paying much attention t o  the 
chances of its o c ~ u r r e n c e . ~  There is also a need t o  understand how the different 
interested parties weigh the  safety issue in relation to  other concerns of a siting 
policy such as  the economic impacts, effects on the environment and how LNG 
serves national energy policy. 
The formulation of alternative strategies will be greatly impacted by the 
decision process of the different parties. One way of clarifying differences 
between the groups is to  specify who is responsible for damages should an 
accident occur. If the location of an LNG facility is viewed primarily as  a private 
venture, then some form of insurance should be offered t o  gas companies t o  pro- 
tect  them against catastrophic losses. If this type of coverage is not available on 
the private market. then government may have to provide this protection. A 
complementary se t  of plans may involve compensating residents of a proposed 
siting area for decreases in their real estate value and perhaps provide them 
with lower energy rates in return for their increased risk in the future. An alter- 
native is to pass regulations such as the one by the Department of Energy which 
requires that  new sites be in remote areas or in locations with relatively small 
population densities. 
IV. I N S U W  CE AGAINST NATURAL HAZARDS~ 
Let us now turn to a more detailed  st^-dy of homeowner decisions on 
whether to protect themselves against the consequences of natural hazards. 
The results raise a se t  of policy-related issues. They also shed light on the deci- 
sion processes individuals are likely to use when dealing with situations such as 
those discussed in the previous section. 
P r o b l e m  F o r n v l a t i o n  
The problem of interest is the appropriate role of the public and private 
sectors in providing insurance protection against the  consequences of natural 
hazards and relief in the aftermath of a disaster. An historical perspective with 
respect to  this problem is relevant here. Annual losses from natural disasters in 
the United States is frequently over $1 billion dollars. Relatively few homeown- 
ers have voluntarily purchased insurance against the  consequences of floods and 
earthquakes, even though coverage is easily available and in the case of floods 
highly subsidized by the federal government. In the past, the U.S government 
has responded to the financial plight of the uninsured victims by providing 
liberal relief in the form of low interest loans and grants to aid the recovery 
efforts. 
Evidence on increased federal disaster relief is provided by comparative 
data on the Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loan program. The 
growth of the program is easily seen in Figure 2; the increase is particularly 
significant in the case of home loans where both the total number and total dol- 
lar values in the 1966-76 period were more than 25 times what they were in the 
first 12 years of the program. It is striking that the  $1.2 billion approved by the 
SBA for victims of Tropical Storm Agnes represented almost four times the 
entire amount allocated by the SBA for all disasters between fiscal years 1954 
and 1965. Over $540 million of the amount approved by the SBA for victims of 
this disaster were in the  form of forgiveness grants which did not have to  be 
repaid. 
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Figure 2. Small business administration disaster loans. 
Interested Parties 
Insurance against floods is provided by the Federal Insurance Administra- 
tion with hqhly subsidized rates on existing property; new property is charged a 
premium based on estimated risk. For insurance to be offered to residents and 
businesses in a hazard-prone region, the community must agree to adopt land 
use regulations and building codes to reduce future losses from the hazard. 
Earthquake coverage is offered to the public by private companies. Even though 
coverage is not expensive ($2 per $1000 coverage on wood-frame homes in Cali- 
fornia with a 5% deductible), less than 3% of the homeowners in this earthquake- 
prone state have bought this insurance. 
The interested parties for this problem are thus the Federal Insurance 
Administration (a  government agency), the private insurance industry (i.e.. 
companies and agents), the Small Business Administration, the residents in 
hazard-prone areas, and the general taxpayer who covers the subsidized portion 
of flood coverage and the subsidized portion of disaster relief. 
Decision Processes 
What are the factors which influence individuals to purchase insurance pro- 
tection against relatively low probability events such as floods and earthquakes? 
To answer this question field survey questionnaires and controlled laboratory 
experiments were undertaken. The field survey involved face-to-face interviews 
with 2,055 homeowners residing in 43 areas throughout the United States sub- 
ject t o  coastal and riverine flooding, and 1,006 homeowners Living in 18 
earthquake-prone areas of California. Half the respondents had purchased flood 
or earthquake insurance, the other half had not. The controlled laboratory 
experiments undertaken by Paul Slovic. Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichten- 
stein, a t  Decision Research, shed Light on the causal relationships between vari- 
ables entering into the  insurance decision. A few of the  key findings from this 
study which relate to individual decision processes are  now summarized. 
Although most uninsured homeowners interviewed were aware that flood 
and earthquake coverage existed, the majority were unaware that  they were eli- 
gible to purchase a policy. Those who were aware had no reliable knowledge of 
the costs of a policy. The subsidized flood rate is between $2.50 and $3.50 per 
$1000 coverage depending on the proportion of coverage devoted to structure 
and contents. The earthquake premium on wood-frame homes in California 
averages $2 per  $1000. Hence any homeowner estimating the respective rates 
between $2 and $4 for flood coverage and $1 and $3 for earthquake insurance 
was classified as reasonably accurate. Figure 3 shows that most of the insured 
homeowners were accurate in their estimate or underestimated the premium. 
Few uninsured individuals had accurate information and a large proportion 
overestimated the premium. This finding suggests that  the uninsured individu- 
als had not made any conscious effort to obtain information on rates from their 
insurance agent even if they knew coverage was available. 
Figure 3. Subjective estimates of insurance premium. 
(per $1,000 coverage) 
With respect to the hazard itself, both insured and unir~sured individuals 
had imperfect information on the probability and consequences of a severe flood 
or earthquake causing damage to their property and contents. When homeown- 
ers  were asked to estimate the chance of a severe flood or earthquake damaging 
their property in the next year, 15 percent of the respondents in flood areas and 
8 percent of those in earthquake areas, were unable to provide any sort of esti- 
mate. Some people thought the probability of a disaster hitting them was quite 
high-1 chance in 10-yet they said they had purchased no disaster insurance. 
Others believed the chances of a disaster affecting them was almost nil-1 in 
100,000-yet they had purchased disaster insurance. It seems clear that  a 
number of individuals participating in the field survey do not understand the 
concept of probability. The findings are consistent with the heuristics and 
biases implied by controlled laboratory experiments over the past decade 
(Fischhoff, e t  al. 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
It is tempting to attribute this casual attitude about the risks of natural 
hazards and protective activities to homeowners' beliefs that the federal govern- 
ment will bail them out in a crisis. But Figure 4 indicates that the majority of 
uninsured residents anticipate no aid a t  all from the government even when 
they expected to  suffer large losses from a disaster. Most of these people were 
aware that  the SEA provides aid to the victims, but they had little knowledge of 
the loan terms or whether they could receive forgiveness grants. On the basis of 
these results, one can conclude that most homeowners in hazard-prone areas 
have not even considered how they would recover should they suffer flood or 
earthquake damage. Instead they treat such events as being so unlikely that  
they ignore the consequences altogether. 
Figure 4. Impact of federal aid on uninsured homeowners. 
What variables influence a person's decision to purchase insurance? A key 
factor is a belief that the hazard is a serious problem. This concern is found pri- 
marily among people who have had past experience with the hazard. "You ask 
me why I didn't have insurance before the June 1972 flood" said one homeowner 
in Norristown, Pennsylvania. "We had the flood in September of '71 and I had two 
fee t  of water in my basement. And I felt this I can tolerate and this is probably 
as  high as it will ever get." To his chagrin, this man suffered severe property 
damage in 1972. Only then did he decide that  he needed insurance. Another 
uninsured flood victim, said that his rationale was that  "the $60 in premiums 
they could use for something else. But now they don't care if the  figure was 
$600. They're going to  take insurance because they've been through it twice 
and they've learned a lesson from it." 
As shown in Figure 5, another important factor in influencing the  purchase 
of a policy appears t o  be knowing someone who has purchased coverage or  dis- 
cussing insurance with a friend, neighbor or  relative. The following example 
graphically illustrates this point. In a pretest  of the  questionnaire in San Fran- 
cisco, a homeowner responded to  one of the questions by saying tha t  he  did not 
have earthquake insurance. A friend of his who was listening t o  the  interview 
commented that  he had himself purchased such insurance a few years before. 
The respondent was dumbfounded and asked his friend about the  availability of 
earthquake coverage and how much it cost. "I'm going to have t o  look into 
earthquake insurance myself," he added. 
Figure 5. Interpersonal communication between insured and uninsured. 
The controlled laboratory experiments on insura ce undertaken a t  Decision 8 Research provides further insight into these results. Subjects were exposed to  
a variety of risks that  had different losses and probabilities associated with 
them. By keeping the premium constant for all risks and varying the  losses and 
probabilities in such a way that  the expected loss (loss multiplied by probability) 
was the  same,  it  was possible to  t e s t  the importance of probability and loss on 
insurance purchase decisions. 
One would expect that  individuals should prefer to insure themselves 
against events having a low probability of occurrence but a high loss ra ther  than 
against those having a high probability and low loss. The reverse was found to  be 
t rue  for a variety of experimental formats. These results suggest tha t  if the  
chances of an event are s ~ ~ c i e n t l y  low, people do not even reflect on its conse- 
quences. In other words, people a re  primarily interested in buying insurance if 
they feel the probability of a disaster is high enough for them t o  s tand a good 
chance of getting a return.  They thus  view insurance as  an .rnvestment ra ther  
t han  a!: protection. 
F o r m u l a t i n g  Al terncrt ive  PoIicies 
There are  a s e t  of allernative policies for dealing with t h e  natural  hazards 
problem outlined above. The cur rent  institutional a r rangements  for floods and 
earthquakes i l l u s t r ays  the role of incentives and regulations to supplement  
marke t  mechanisms. 
In the  case  of the  flood hazard, t h e  federal government offers subsidized 
premiums as a n  incentive for residents  t o  purchase coverage. They also a r e  
imposing specific land use regulations on communities who participate in t h e  
flood program. More recently banks have required homeowners t o  purchase  
flood insurance a s  a condition for obtaining a mortgage. Those who apply for  
federal  relief af ter  a disaster a r e  also required to purchase coverage a s  a condi- 
tion for obtaining a low interest  loan. For these  groups, flood insurance is man- 
da tory  r a the r  t h a n  voluntary. 
Protect ion against ear thquake damage has been more of a private r a the r  
t han  public afTair. No one is required t o  purchase insurance a s  a condition for a 
mortgage or  a disaster  loan. Even though coverage is available, there has  been 
no  g rea t  effort  made  by insurance companies o r  their agents t o  actively m a r k e t  
policies. The insurance industry claims tha t  i t  does 'not  have enough rein- 
surance  capacity t o  cover the  damage from a catastrophic quake in a populated 
a r e a  of California if most  residents  and businesses were protected with 
insurance. Today the  principal government role with respect  to t h e  hazard is 
through local building codes and ordnances on the  design of s t ruc tures  and t h e  
provisions of federal aid t o  cover the uninsured portion of an earthquake loss. 
Other programs for coping with the  problem a re  stimulated by the following 
questions: 
(1) What types of information would enable peop!e to  make  b e t t e r  deci- 
sions for coping with the  risk? How can either the insurance industry, 
government a t  all levels (i.e., federal, s t a t e ,  and local) and/or public 
in te res t  groups aid in this effort? 
One course of action is to  make  flood and earthquake coverage m o r e  
attractive by presenting information through normal channels. The 
insurance agent may serve a n  important  and useful function in this 
regard. To the ex tent  t h a t  he has  the t rus t  of his clients, he can  stirnu- 
late their  awareness of the  hazard by telling them the chances of a 
h s a s t e r  occurring and the  potential losses tha t  could result .  One way 
for t h e  agent t o  increase the  client's concern with the  hazard may b e  
to  present  information on the  probability of a disaster on a different 
t ime interval than the traditional one year  period. For example, in 
describing the  chances of a 100 yea r  flood, the agent  could note t h a t  
for someone living in a house for 25 years ,  t he  chances of suffering 
damage a t  least once will be  .22. He can  also provide details a s  t o  what 
coverage is available and  how much  it costs. Since most  individuals 
s eem t o  t r ea t  insurance a s  a n  investment, the agent should educate  
his cl' nts  tha t  the biggest r e t u r n  on their  policy 1s t o  have no r e tu rn  
a t  all. kr 
What is the balance between the use of market mechanisms for equat- 
ing supply and demand, developing appropriate incentives (e.g., taxes 
and subsidies) as well as regulatory measures (e.g.. required insurance 
coverage) in the design of a hazards strategy? 
Financial institutions may play a key role here by requiring some type 
of natural hazard insurance as a condition for a mortgage on residen- 
tial property. Several types of policies deserve consideration. One 
option would be a broader form of homeowners insurance which com- 
bines flood and earthquake. A less extreme proposal would be to add 
only earthquake coverage to  a standard homeowners policy and main- 
tain the current flood insurance program. A third option would be to 
maintain the current insurance coverage m d  provide disaster relief to 
special groups or for special situations. Distributional cost considera- 
tions may suggest that special treatment be given to  low-income or 
elderly residents. 
Evaluating Strategies 
Any strategy or program impacts on the interested parties in different 
ways. The evaluation phase forces policy makers to come to grips with the ques- 
tion as to  the appropriate role of the public and private sectors in hazard 
management. To illustrate, consider two contrasting scenarios. In scenario 1. 
acts of God, such as floods and earthquakes, are viewed as  a public responsibil- 
ity; then liberal disaster relief should be provided to all victims and/or highly 
subsidized insurance offered to residents in hazard-prone areas. In scenario 2, 
individuals are expected to  assume the responsibility for protecting themselves 
against the hazard; then private insurance should be offered and those who 
decide not to  purchase coverage voluntarily will be forced to  suffer the conse- 
quences. Scenario 1 is equivalent to  assigning a high weight to  potential victims 
and a low weight to the general taxpayer. Scenario 2 gives increased impor- 
tance t o  the general taxpayer. In this case, policies which require individuals 
faced with a risk to bear the cost of potential losses are  viewed as being attrac- 
tive. How this evaluation process currently takes place and should take place in 
the future is an important topic for discussion. 
V. TOWARDS A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF CHOICE 
The examples presented above suggest the need for an understanding of the 
decision processes of the interested parties before one can recommend 
different policies. A first step in this direction is depicted in Figure 6 where the 
three interested parties-consurners. firms, and government-are linked to a se t  
of events (e.g., catastrophes, accidents) each of which has a probability and loss 
associated with it. To make the problem more concrete and realistic assume 
that  there are  n diderent consumer groups some of which have diEerent possi- 
ble losses and probabilities associated with a particular event. For example, 
there may be m e r e n t  exposures to a certain hazard so that the chances of 
incurring a specified loss will differ between individuals. Assume that  there are 
m identical firms each providing the same type of protection (e.g.. insurance) 
against the consequences of these events. 
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Figure 6. Descriptive component. 
Per fomance  of a  Market S y s t e m  
Given this simplified world it should then be possible to  analyze how well a 
market  system opera tes  under  a variety of different assumptions regarding the  
accuracy of information by consumers and firms on the distribution of events. 
For example, suppose consumers and firms have perfect information on the pro- 
bability and loss distribution of events. What type of insurance policies will  be  
offered to  consumer groups? How does the situation change when there  is 
imperfect information by  ei ther  or both of these parties? 
A similar analysis can  be  undertaken i f  one postulates difierent types of 
decision rules used by consumers o r  firms. For example, suppose tha t  each con- 
sumer  evaluates the  benefits and costs of purchasing insurance and chooses a n  
amount  (possibly no coverage) which maximizes expected utility. How much 
insurance will each consumer  group purchase and what types of coverage will 
firms offer? Suppose, on t h e  other hand, tha t  consumers utilize a threshold 
model of choice: if the probability of the event is perceived t o  b e  below some 
critical level t hen  the person ignores its consequences and does not consider 
any type of protection; otherwise they purchase the amount  of coverage which 
maximizes expected utility. What impact will such a behavioral model have on 
the  types of insurance policies offered by firms and the degree of protection 
adopted by consumers? In a similar vein one can  investigate the  lmpact of a 
model where factors such  a s  past  experience anc! discussions with friends and 
neighbors trigger sea rch  for new information and interest in protective rneas- 
ures  such as  insurance. 
The impact of different assumptions regarding the accuracy of information 
and alternative decision rules can  be investigated either a t  one point of t ime or  
in a dynamic context. When one looks a t  the  situation over time then there is a 
need t o  specify the  different rules tha t  consumers and firms are  likely to u"l' ~1 ize 
for updating information on the  probability and consequences of specific events. 
As shown by Arrow (1963) and Akerlof (1970) there  a re  problems of adverse 
selection when firms have misinformation or imperfect information on the risks 
each of the n consumer groups are facing. For example, if firms cannot distin- 
guish between high and low risk groups they may se t  a premium based on the 
average probability of a loss. If consumers have accurate information on the 
hazard, high risk groups will find this policy to be much more attractive than low 
risk groups. and will purchase a proportionately larger share of the total cover- 
age. Over time, claims experience leads firms to se t  higher and higher premi- 
ums, thus making insurance less and less attractive to  those in the lower risk 
classes. Eventually the only group who finds insurance to be attractive are  
those in the highest risk class. 
The above example illustrating market failure is important for prescriptive 
purposes because it indicates that  the private sector may not provide satisfac- 
tory protective solutions t o  potentially disastrous events, either because of 
misinformation and/or because of the decision processes of the interested par- 
ties. The lack of protection may then be very costly to both the disaster victims 
(who may not be able t o  get  protection or are unaware of the consequences of 
the hazard) as well as the general taxpayer (who may have to foot the bill after a 
disaster occurs). The example also suggests the importance of determining 
what information consumers and firms have available, how accurate these data 
a re  and how they a r e  actually utilized in the decision-making process. 
Role of C o v e m m e n t  
If consumers and/or firms have misinformation, one of the important roles 
that  the third party, government, can play is to provide better  data on the 
hazard itself (e.g., losses, probabilities of its occurrence) as well as ways of pro- 
tecting oneself (e.g., available insurance, type of coverage and its cost). I t  can 
also provide monetary incentives to encourage certain actions (i.e.. subsidies) 
as well as disincentives (i.e.. fines, taxes) to inhibit or  discourage certain types 
of behavior. Finally, i t  can regulate or require certain types of actions. 
The success of each of these approaches depends on the decision processes 
of the interested parties and the objectives of df lerent  policies. Thus, if consu- 
mers are maximizing expected utility then a subsidized insurance premium 
would lead to  an increase in demand for coverage. This type of incentive system 
would have no effect for any consumer who behaved according to a threshold 
model and perceived the probability of a event to  be below his critical level. In 
the latter case the only way t o  induce interest in insurance is to provide infor- 
mation on the hazard so that  the probability is perceived to be above the critical 
level(s) or to require the person to have insurance coverage. 
From a dynamic viewpoint there is a need to understand differences in ez- 
a n t e  estimates and ex-post valuations and their effect on policy. Prior to a 
disaster an individual is likely to behave with one set of estimates of the proba- 
bility and losses. After an event occurs he may revise his estimate considerably, 
partly on the basis of the new information (i.e.. updating his prior estimates of 
probabilities and losses) but also because of the nature of this decision process 
(e.g., he now views the probability to be above a critical threshold level and 
hence is concerned with possible losses). If government policy responds t o  
these ex post perception changes in a way that was unanticipated prior to the 
disaster, this process has to be understood before one designs policies. A clear 
example of this behavior is in the  natural hazards field: government provided 
liberal d sa s t e r  after the occurrence of a disaster because few people protected 
themselves prior to the event. If crises normally trigger unanticipated reac- 
tions due to political and social pressures (c.f.. the Three Mile Island response), 
then this process must be taken into account in designing appropriate strz-  
tegies for dealing with low probability-high consequence events. 
Finally, there are a set of philosophical znd ethical issues that have to be 
addressed directly when evaluating the role of government as part  of any alter- 
native plan. Given our increased understanding of the imperfect information 
and simplified rules that people use in making decisions, there is the open ques- 
tion as to "when should we protect individuals from themselves?" If policy mak- 
e r s  have learned from experience that there is ex post regret by uninsured con- 
sumers after  an event, what type of incentives or regulations, if any, should be 
taken ex ante? There is no- easy answer to  this query but it should be explicitly 
addressed as an issue regarding the appropriate role of government in dealing 
with the consequences of low probability events. I t  also illustrates the interac- 
tion between the descriptive and prescriptive components depicted in the con- 
ceptual framework (Figure 1) which has motivated this paper. 
For an excellent discussion of how one can specify goals and objectives for 
societal problems, see Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Chapters 1 & 2. 
For an analysis of alternative remedies proposed by the  Federal Trade Com- 
mission in the context of these and other costs,  see  Federal Trade Comrnis- 
sion 1979. 
The specific standards a r e  tha t  the foot cannot  reach the blade of t h e  
mower and tha t  the blade must  stop within 3 seconds of release of the  
power switch so the hand cannot reach the turning blade. 
These differences a r e  clearly seen in the LNG siting debate in California. 
For more  detail on this case, see Ahearn 1980, in press; Deutsch in press; 
Kunreuther 1980; and Linnerooth 1980. 
The material  in the next section summarizes t h e  findings from a four-year 
s tudy supported by funds from the National Science Foundation. Readers 
interested in more detail a r e  referred to Kunreuther,  e t  al. 1978. 
More details on the insurance experiments can be found in Slovic, e t  al. 
1977. The material also appears  in Kunreuther, e t  al. 1979, Chap. 7. 
A more  detailed discussion of policy options appears  in Ginsberg and Kun- 
r eu the r  (in press).  
Kunreuther and Schoemaker (in press) provide a more detailed discussion 
of the role of the agent and the insurance industry in promoting the sale of 
flood coverage. 
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